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Executive Summary
Demand for textiles and clothing (TscC] has been 
rising quickly in the developed world (the European 
Union and United States], and it is forecast to 
grow further in the future. At the same time, espe­
cially during the past decade or so, low-income 
developing countries have greatly increased their 
TstC production, allowing them to develop their 
TstC industry and utilize their vast resources of 
low-skilled labor.
For 30 years the world's richest countries have 
imposed stringent quotas on imports of TstC. 
From 1974 to 1995, the Multi-Fiber Arrangement 
(MFA) defined the regulations for tariffs and 
quotas1 on all TstC trade categories. The Uruguay 
Round (UR] Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(ATC] stipulated that import quotas be eliminated 
in a four-stage process between 1995 and 2005. 
Over that period TstC quotas were gradually 
reduced, and on January 1, 2005, all TstC cate­
gories were brought under the regular World 
Trade Organization (WTO] rules that apply to 
other manufactured goods.
It was certain that after the lifting of T&C quotas 
there would be winners and losers. Although 
Canada, the European Union (EU], and the United 
States have implemented safeguard measures2 as 
permitted by the general WTO agreement, imports 
were projected to rise and prices to fall. The T&C 
producers in these countries would face serious 
competition and their market shares would shrink. 
It was also likely that China would capture a large
1 An export tariff is a tax levied by a government on 
goods being exported. Export tariffs are often used in 
attempt to counteract dumping. Tariffs may be distin­
guished from other taxes in that their predominant pur­
pose is not financial but economic— not to increase a 
nation's revenue but to protect domestic industries from 
foreign competition, in the context o f international 
trade, a quota is a government-imposed limit on the 
quantity o f goods that may be exported or imported 
within a given time period. By limiting foreign goods, a 
quota aims to allow domestic goods to compete more 
successfully, though the price of the goods may also rise.
2 A  safeguard measure is a temporary or intermittent 
restriction o f imports of a product. Such measures are 
used to protect specific domestic industries from an 
increase in imports of any product that is causing, or 
that is threatening to cause, serious injury to the domes­
tic industry.
share of the market, leaving smaller developing 
countries with very little of the market.
Aside from these concerns, quotas present many 
other policy issues in bilateral and multilateral 
trade. Quotas undermine the competitive advantage 
of developing countries and restrict them to pro­
ducing at lower levels than they would have under 
free trade. Quotas also impose additional costs and 
distortions owing to the monitoring needed to 
keep track of country of origin, as well as the rent 
seeking and rerouting that occur in an attempt to 
bypass the provisions.
Your assignment is to prepare recommendations 
for a new international agreement for trade in tex­
tiles and clothing that would be acceptable to 
Bangladesh, China, the EU, Honduras, and the 
United States. Discuss the policy issues with regard 
to support for and resistance to eliminating the 
quotas. Justify your recommendations, and assess 
the consequences for stakeholder groups.
Background
Since the early 1990s, demand for T&C has been 
rising quickly in the developed world (the EU and 
the United States], and forecasts show that it will 
continue to grow. Meanwhile, T&C production in 
low-income countries has increased substantially, 
allowing these countries to expand their industry 
and utilize their vast resources of low-skilled, cheap 
labor. Low-income countries that can produce both 
textiles and clothing at very low prices make it 
increasingly difficult for domestic industries in the 
EU and United States to compete.
On the other hand, developed countries imposed 
stringent quotas on imports of T&C under the 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA], Although in­
tended to protect domestic industry, the quotas 
led to a series of perverse consequences, which 
grew worse the longer the quotas remained intact 
(Rivoli 2005b], Importers and subsidized manufac­
turers in the EU and United States succeeded 
because they could avoid risks and competition 
through trade protection, which in turn forced 
poorer countries to lower their prices further and 
further to compete. Because the quotas "protected" 
producers at each stage of production (yarn, fabric,
finished goods], the removal of the quotas 
imperiled rather than enhanced protected pro­
ducers' chances of remaining competitive. High-end 
producers in the EU and United States now face 
with even higher costs and fewer choices in 
purchasing inputs (Rivoli 2005b).
Trends and Trade Patterns
Textile and clothing trade is strongly influenced by 
established networks and geographical proximity. 
Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East domi­
nate the EU market because of their proximity to 
the EU and their relatively cheap labor. In 2004 
EU enlargement made trade with the newly acced­
ing—and mostly poor—Eastern European coun­
tries even easier. For the United States, the most 
important suppliers are Latin America, China, and 
the Asian newly industrializing countries [Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) because 
of either geographic proximity or preferential 
trading agreements-
Although they are two distinctly different indus­
tries, T&C have become increasingly meshed and 
their fates increasingly dependent on each other, as 
their supply chains have been vertically integrated. 
It is common today for clothing retailers to man­
age the supply chain of manufacturing (exemplified 
by the large multinational corporations that oper­
ate all over the world). This vertical integration has 
occurred simultaneously with the rise of globaliza­
tion and the corresponding increase of goods 
traded internationally. In the low- to middle-priced 
clothing market, the role of the retailer has become 
increasingly prominent in the organization of the 
supply chain. As the retail market has become 
more concentrated, the multinational retailers have 
attained more power because they can capitalize on 
their integrated vertical supply chain. They have 
market power in both the consumer market and 
the input market (because of their buying power). 
Given their wide consumer base and often well- 
built brand name, multinationals are attractive 
investors for developing countries with cheap labor 
ready to supply the T&C industry.
Vertical integration3 has become commonplace 
because of the increasing popularity of lean retail­
3 In vertical integration one company controls all stages 
o f production of a good, from the acquisition o f raw 
materials to the retailing o f the final product.
ing. Lean retailing requires frequent, smaller stock 
replenishments to retailers, giving them the flexi­
bility to adjust to quickly changing consumer tastes 
and styles. It is dependent on bar codes, uniform 
product codes, and electronic information 
processing. This technology has allowed retailers to 
monitor extremely precisely and quickly what sells, 
what does not, and when. It may have been the 
fundamental advance that allowed the textile indus­
try to take off and expand as it has.
In practice, lean retailing works as follows: lean 
retailers in the United States replenish their stores 
weekly; sales data are analyzed over the weekend, 
and replacement orders are placed Monday morn­
ing. The manufacturers may have one week to fill 
the order. This organizational structure, with the 
appropriate technology to accompany it, allows the 
retailer to hold less inventory with less risk, 
reducing costs in two areas. With a constant stream 
of sales and inventory information, retailers can 
produce accurate and up-to-date demand forecasts, 
maintain good control, and sell to a larger market. 
It also allows them a high degree of flexibility to 
quickly discontinue goods that are not selling as 
well. For manufacturers, this system means a very 
short lead time. This arrangement explains why 
vertical integration is so attractive and why trade in 
textile and clothing has become more and more 
international at all levels as it has become more and 
more decentralized: a multinational in the United 
States buys raw materials from one low-income 
country, ships it to another for manufacturing, and 
then ships it to Europe, the United States, or both 
for retail sale.
When a corporation can vertically integrate in a 
single country, it gains an even more economical 
and flexible production chain and achieves even 
faster time to market. For a poor country, having a 
well-integrated production network is a great asset 
in entering the export market and being competi­
tive. The quality of infrastructure is important 
because it helps ensure timeliness, good tracking, 
and the ability to meet production targets. 
Improvement in infrastructure is necessary in many 
developing countries; this is often their differen­
tiating factor, especially in Asia. The poorer and 
smaller Asian countries have tended to specialize in 
one stage of the production chain (Nordas 2004), 
because they must often import a lot of the fabric 
and textiles for manufacturing ( The Econom ist 
2005a). China was originally a producer of fabrics
and outsourced much of its assembly and manufac­
turing to nearby Asian countries like Bangladesh. 
As the industry [and its regulations] undergoes 
constant change, other textile producers are con­
cerned about China's developing strong infra­
structure all the way along the chain.
U.S. T&C Trade and Employment
Textiles and clothing account for 7 percent of 
global trade. The EU and the United States 
together import 70 percent of the world's T&C. 
Between 1995 and 2002, the share of the EU and 
the United States in the world's total textile 
imports increased from 35 to 44 percent, mainly 
owing to an increase in the U.S. share of imports 
from 14 to 21 percent. The shares of Canada and 
the EU remained stable during this period.
For U.S. T&C imports, the changes in market share 
reflected the impact of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement [NAFTA], Honduras entered the 
list of top 10 suppliers. India and Pakistan took 
higher shares of imports at the expense of Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, higher-income and more distant 
Asian suppliers, whose market shares sharply 
decreased [Nordas 2004], Total imports of cloth­
ing grew slightly less than textiles in the United 
States. Mexico increased its export market share in 
the United States from 7 to 12 percent. There was 
an increase in the market share of the “other coun­
tries," from 37 to 41 percent, showing that a num­
ber of smaller suppliers are gaining market share 
[notably Sri Lanka],
The United States has witnessed a much stronger 
decline in employment than the EU in the textile 
and clothing sectors, primarily in clothing. 
Employment figures dropped nearly 50 percent 
between 1995 and 2002 [Buelens 2005], In some 
EU countries, like Greece and Portugal, textile and 
clothing account for a larger share of their econo­
mies than in the average EU country, and T&C 
employment levels in those two countries buoyed 
the total EU T&C employment level. Between 1995 
and 2002, absolute employment figures dropped in 
China and India, yet the sheer size of their work­
forces dwarfs other countries. Other developing 
countries with notable changes are Mexico and 
Morocco, both of which showed increases in 
employment over this period because they directly 
border major importers [the United States and the 
EU, respectively].
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
CATC)
The UR Agreement on Textiles and Clothing was 
created to reduce trade distortions in T&C gradu­
ally and to allow both importers and chief export­
ers to adjust. The impact of the ATC had four 
main dimensions: [1] political gain from a credible 
multilateral trading system, [2] efficiency gains after 
quota elimination, [3] loss of quota rents, and [4] 
gains to consumers. The idea was that the gradual 
changes, with each stage allowing for more gradu­
ated change, would allow the industry to adjust 
over time to the four dimensions of impact.
The ATC had four stages of quota reduction, until 
quotas were eliminated in 2005. Each stage inte­
grated more products into the category of non- 
restricted products, but by the third stage [begin­
ning on January 1, 2002] it became apparent that 
the products that were being integrated accounted 
for a minimal share of the total amounts of T&C 
being traded on the world market.
To illustrate why these stages were not effective in 
"gradually" reducing quotas, it is helpful to look 
the unit value of the categories that were freed 
from quota restriction. China, with its cheap labor, 
scant regulation, and seemingly unending potential 
for cheap textile production, entered the WTO in 
2002 and has achieved domestic economic growth 
while maintaining its competitive strength inter­
nationally. As it opened itself more and more to 
foreign markets, China took a larger share of the 
import market, and the unit value of these goods 
decreased. Market share declined for the remaining 
Asian countries, mostly smaller producers and all 
smaller than China. Thus, a large part of China's 
import share gain was at the expense of smaller 
developing countries [Buelens 2005], This outcome 
was in line with the trends of the past 10 to 15 
years. In 2002 in China, every category of T&C 
exports decreased in unit value, with some 
decreases as high as 55 percent [11 categories total]. 
Thus, for China there has been an inverse relation­
ship between its change in market share and 
changes in unit value, reflecting the impact of 
increased competitiveness. Although Bangladesh 
and India also saw a decline in unit value in some 
categories, other categories saw an increase 
[Buelens 2005], The general trend in the T&C 
industry at the time was that more categories were
becoming cheaper, and those were growing the 
fastest.
On January 1, 2005, the quotas were lifted. As 
expected, exports from China soared. Total Chinese 
textile and clothing exports to the United States 
were 60 percent higher in the first quarter of 
2005 than in the same period in 2004 [ The 
Econom ist 2005a]. China's exports to the EU rose 
by more than 30 percent, pushing China's total 
share in global clothing trade to 28 percent. 
China's growing market share had striking effects 
on both importing and exporting countries. 
Exports from Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka to the United States all 
declined. African and Latin American textile and 
clothing producers were hit particularly hard. 
Exports to the United States under the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act4 [AGOA] fell by 25 
percent in the first three months of 2005, and 
thousands of jobs disappeared. The International 
Labor Organization reported that the main losers 
in the world clothing market overall were South 
Korea, Taiwan, and a number of other smaller 
developing countries.
Thus, the lifting of the quotas had positive effects 
and some immediate negative effects. Large import­
ers found their long-protected domestic industries 
bombarded with cheap imports with which they 
simply could not compete considering their higher 
labor costs. These cheaper imports did, however, 
benefit consumers. Across the EU, consumers were 
paying billions of euros more for protected domes­
tic production of T&C goods. The new arrange­
ment would also allow the retail and sales sectors to 
grow in an unwarped manner, based on consumer 
demand and market supply, and would allow the 
retail sector to grow in an uninhibited fashion, 
diversifying or homogenizing depending on 
consumer preferences.
Owing to surging imports from Asia [mostly 
China], by June 2005 the United States had rein­
stated quotas under the safeguard protection clause 
in 7 of the 11 categories. Annual growth of imports 
in each category is restricted to 7.5 percent, and
4 A G O A  was passed by the U.S. Congress in May 2000 
as Title 1 o f the Trade and Development A ct o f 2000. 
The purpose o f this legislation was to help stimulate eco­
nomic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.
the restriction is renewable for three years until 
2008.
China and the EU engaged in bilateral trade negoti­
ations to "manage China's integration into the 
global economy in a sensible and smooth way" [ The 
Econom ist 2005c] and came to an agreement in 
July 2005. If the quota removal were to remain, 
the mix of products in each designated category 
[goods produced are each assigned to their appro­
priate category with assigned quotas] would likely 
shift toward lower-priced goods, and thus it was 
expected that the unit values would decrease sig­
nificantly. The final decision made allowed quotas 
to remain in place, limiting the growth of 10 cate­
gories of Chinese textile exports to 8 percent to 
12.5 percent each year until the end of 2008 [ The 
Econom ist 2005c], During these month-long nego­
tiations, however, Chinese exporters were rapidly 
expanding production of apparel and textiles in 
anticipation of the opening of the EU market. 
When the negotiations were finalized, there was a 
stockpile of goods well over the decided quota at 
European and Chinese ports waiting to be 
imported. Further discussions continued and 
reached a solution: half the goods were allowed 
free entry into Europe and the rest were imported 
by borrowing from 2006 quotas. For the United 
States and China, no such bilateral agreement was 
reached. The two sides apparently kept getting 
stalled on basic elements such as the length of the 
pact.
The pressure to protect domestic textile industries 
in both the EU and the United States is immense; 
lobbyists and unions alike are putting pressure on 
the government to "keep jobs at home" and "pro­
tect the workers." Moreover, it is generally more 
difficult to pressure a national government to make 
an active fundamental change. Politically, the pro­
tectionists probably have a slight advantage because 
they are merely pressuring the federal government 
to keep the status quo.
Policy Issues
The ATC's phasing out of T&C quotas has raised a 
number of issues. First, although there is an appar­
ent consensus to eliminate quotas, there is resist­
ance from the most-developed countries and the 
main importers, as well as from smaller developing 
countries that cannot compete with China. Second,
despite the 10-year period of the easing of quotas 
in the T&C sector, countries did not use that time 
efficiently to make the necessary adjustments in 
domestic markets. Third, the legal provision of 
safeguard measures in the WTO agreement under­
scores the authority of the EU and the United 
States to continue their protectionism. Domestic 
policy issues, such as the protection of domestic 
jobs in the EU and U.S. textile and clothing sectors, 
must also be considered.
China remains a special concern. China was wel­
comed into the WTO in 2002 after making a series 
of important commitments to open and liberalize 
its market in order to better integrate into the 
world economy and offer a safer and more predict­
able environment for trade and foreign investment 
in accordance with WTO rules.
For the 12 years following accession, there will be a 
special transitional safeguard mechanism in cases 
where imports of Chinese products cause, or 
threaten to cause, market disruption to the domes­
tic producers of other WTO members. Previous 
prohibitions, quotas, and other restrictions against 
imports from China that are inconsistent with the 
WTO agreement, however, will be phased out or 
otherwise dealt with.
With respect to T&C trade, this means that when 
China acceded to the WTO it became subject to 
the rights and obligations of the ATC. There is a 
safeguard mechanism in place specifically for T&C 
categories from 2005 until the end of 2008, per­
mitting any WTO member country to take action 
to curb imports in case of market disruptions 
caused by Chinese exports. Chinese textile factories 
have tended to specialize in one process and finish 
goods overseas to avoid quotas. But unlike its main 
rivals, China has the advantage of huge domestic 
fiber and fabric production. Without quotas, it 
could build vertically integrated firms, lowering 
costs, raising quality, and cutting time to market 
( The Econom ist 2005a], This situation offers an 
attractive opportunity for foreign multinationals to 
either contract with or own Chinese factories [most 
of which specialize in one production process] and 
then to ship the goods overseas to be finished and 
thus avoid quotas. Here is yet another area where 
removal of quotas would allow China to produce at 
an even lower cost—vertical integration in a variety 
of areas throughout the industry will give them an 
advantage over many other countries. It also will
provide new opportunities for Chinese T&C 
businesses, which have grown over the years.
As discussed earlier, an area of serious concern for 
governments is the impact of the dramatic fall in 
T&C prices on domestic industries in the EU, the 
United States, and other developing countries. 
Many forecasts show that China will take 50 
percent of the U.S. market and 29 percent of the 
EU market once quotas are lifted. This shift could 
be bad news for many of the smaller and poorer 
nations [mostly in Asia] that have had no direct 
foreign investment to beef up manufacturing and 
for others that may have slightly higher living 
standards, and thus labor costs, that make it harder 
for them to compete with China's labor force. One 
model shows that Bangladesh, Turkey, and coun­
tries in North Africa and Eastern Europe could be 
squeezed out of the EU market, and African and 
Mexican apparel manufacturers out of the U.S. 
market [Nordas 2004].
Most economic models are created without fac­
toring in the nuances of the textile and apparel 
industry, such as the time-to-market issue. Fashion 
has increasingly become a time-oriented, fast- 
moving market, and apparel is seen as "a perishable 
good" [ The Econom ist 2005b], and it shows no 
sign of changing. China may be the cheapest 
option, with the largest supply of cheap labor and a 
newly opened economy, but if there is a disruption 
in the supply chain, retailers need to have other 
sources of imports. This need to reduce risk and 
diversify supply may create an opportunity for 
other developing countries to compete with China 
to meet the great consumer demand for apparel.
For the United States, Chinese monetary policy and 
the exchange rate is also an important issue. Most 
textile firms [and U.S. politicians] want to keep 
quotas unless China revalues its currency. Cur­
rently the yuan is fixed to the dollar at an artifi­
cially low exchange rate [although this is arguably 
likely to change], China is not currently subject to 
the U.S. antisubsidy law because it is deemed a 
"nonmarket economy" [which makes it easier for 
U.S. firms to file antidumping cases against it]. But 
it is against WTO rules to declare China a market 
economy for the purposes of subsidies and a non- 
market economy for the purposes of antidumping. 
A new piece of U.S. legislation is in process—the 
Stopping Overseas Subsidies Act—that would allow 
U.S. firms to get countervailing duties to make up
for Chinese subsidies, including a subsidized 
exchange rate. This act would make duties and 
subsidies dependent on the currency value.
Stakeholders
For the past 30 years the intertemporal T&C 
quotas have prevented many developing countries 
from reaping the full benefits of the growth in 
global trade in this industry. A variety of multi­
national corporations have contributed a lot of 
foreign direct investment to start-ups in the cloth­
ing and textile infrastructure in lower-income coun­
tries in East Asia [notably China], Southeast Asia 
[notably Bangladesh and India], and Latin America 
[notably Mexico], as well as in North Africa and 
Turkey.
Commercial subsectors such as textile producers, 
retailers, and import companies throughout the EU 
and United States also have an interest in T&C 
trade issues. There are also some differences within 
regions, such as among European countries. France, 
Greece, and Portugal are more concerned about 
the importation of T&C goods than other EU 
countries because their T&C manufacturing and 
production industries still count for a significant 
portion of their economy.
Different parties have different concerns. For 
example, Latin America is concerned about com­
petition from China and its well-integrated produc­
tion networks. China and other Asian producers 
have concerns about Latin America's proximity to 
the United States and the proximity of Turkey, 
North Africa, and Eastern Europe to the EU. Asian 
producers may also be concerned about increasing 
energy prices.
Poor countries are concerned about China and its 
imminent development. In some small Asian coun­
tries, clothing makes up as much as 66 percent of 
exports [Bangladesh], These countries do not pro­
duce their own raw textiles and rely on imports, 
which raises the price of clothing, even if only 
marginally. This fact makes them less competitive as 
clothing exporters and can even put them into 
debt if clothing sales do not exceed the cost of 
imported inputs. China has maintained its position 
as the world's largest exporter of both textiles and 
clothing since 1995. After the 2002 liberalization, 
China's import share of global T&C jumped from
25 to 40 percent in the categories that had been 
the most restricted [Buelens 2005], This is a good 
illustration of how the lower the quotas were kept 
by importing nations, the larger their adjustment 
will be.
Policy Options
Complex policy issues face all the parties involved. 
Many do not believe that safeguard measures are 
justified, especially when they are costing con­
sumers and taxpayers money. Although the transi­
tion period 1995-2005 was poorly used, this may 
no longer be an excuse to continue quotas or allow 
limitless safeguard measures. Large and instan­
taneous changes in prices, production, market 
shares are normal, and what will follow the transi­
tion is a normal and expected adjustment to the 
new trade and production patterns [Buelens 2005],
The likelihood that one or two big developing 
countries will take most of the market is of serious 
concern. This issue has united many parties that are 
commonly on opposing sides. A real hinging issue 
is the industrial countries' reluctance to deal with 
adjustment issues directly, and there is no mechan­
ism to force them to do so on any timeline other 
than their own voluntary one. Again, there is 
immense domestic pressure to continue to protect 
these industries, which are home to a long produc­
tion line and many jobs. It appears that industrial 
countries countries do not want to eliminate 
quotas until they have "moved" enough citizens 
out of this industry, either through job creation or 
a simple cyclical downturn.
One policy option for industrial countries may be 
to enact a clause encouraging importation from 
multiple sources either in a WTO agreement or, 
better yet, in federal trade regulation. Such a clause 
would benefit a range of developing countries that 
are smaller than China and India. It would also as­
suage rich countries' concerns about China's rising 
too quickly and outcompeting them. Another issue 
that may need to be taken into account is the cost 
of transport and energy and how it may affect 
price of goods. If the cost is high enough to make 
goods from China less competitive, it opens the 
door for trade with countries that are closer geo­
graphically but that have slightly higher unit prices. 
Currently this issue is never cited as affecting the 
price of goods.
Export tariffs in the textiles and clothing sector 
may also be another policy option for developing 
countries to consider. In December 2004 China 
imposed an export tariff, raising the price of its 
goods and making them slightly less competitive, 
but the country was at least able to keep the cash 
and avoid safeguard measures enacted by importing 
nations. The optimistic theory is that the govern­
ment can use the money it collects to benefit the 
population as a whole, although China's goods will 
be slightly less competitive. Export tariffs may be a 
viable option only for a country like China, but for 
most other developing countries, establishing a 
tariff would likely make them too uncompetitive 
and hurt their economy. The use of export tariffs 
has been a hotly debated issue in the WTO.
In May 2005 China increased export taxes uni­
laterally by up to 400 percent for 74 clothing 
products, which account for about 20 percent of 
clothing exports. The economic impact of this 
change should be minimal because it affects only 3 
percent of the mainland's exports. The effect on 
the upstream textile industry will be more signifi­
cant, however, because the percentage increase in 
price is compounded in each item. The new tax 
level represents 6 percent of the overall cost per 
item of clothing. When one considers that profit 
margins are already slim, this change could 
seriously reduce the competitiveness of the indus­
try ( The Econom ist 2005a],
Small low-income countries [LICs] that compete 
with China may want to focus on how policy can 
promote vertical specialization in the T&C industry. 
Most smaller LICs may have a lower average wage 
than China but cannot compete on speed, quality 
control, reliability, and scale, all of which affect the 
price (especially in an industry where time-to- 
market has become vital]. Vertical specialization will 
help improve these characteristics, as well as 
improve communications, as these industries grow 
and develop. These improvements would allow 
them to better compete with China and, with quota 
removal, would make these countries more attrac­
tive to importing countries seeking to import from 
multiple sources.
Another tactic developing countries may consider 
is lowering import tariffs on textiles. Lowering 
tariffs may have a substantial positive impact in the 
short run, as lower and more uniform tariffs on 
inputs translate immediately into lower and less
distorted input prices for producers. Textiles are 
often protected for industrial policy purposes—in 
industrial and poor countries alike—but the costs 
to the clothing and apparel industry should be 
weighed against the benefits to the textile industry. 
To thrive in an increasingly competitive environ­
ment, the clothing industry must be able to acquire 
its inputs at world prices.
Another issue is access to capital, which is difficult 
for clothing firms and constitutes a major entry 
barrier for new entrepreneurs. While weighing 
policy options, LICs must consider whether their 
business environment is adequate for foreign 
investment. [For example, do they have the capacity 
to handle large sums of money? Can business oper­
ate relatively easily?] Liberalization of the financial 
markets in LICs combined with sound macro- 
economic policy could bring in new foreign capital 
and help overcome this bottleneck, but only in the 
long run. In the short run, the introduction of spe­
cial credit facilities for small microenterprises may 
show some positive effects. Bangladesh is a good 
example.
In summary, governments of poor countries have a 
crucial role to play in leading and coordinating a 
coherent strategy for the textile and clothing sec­
tor, with significant help from donors and inter­
national organizations. Short-term measures such as 
technical training and streamlining of customs pro­
cedures have the potential to substantially and 
quickly improve the competitive position of firms. 
Bilateral agreements on trade liberalization may also 
be possible for short-term measures, and parties 
may be more likely to compromise on short-term 
issues than on long-term commitments. More gen­
erally, the debate on industrial policy and the 
appropriate role of governments is more open than 
ever. Each LDC has its own characteristics and 
therefore needs to define its own policy. Yet in 
today's international trade environment, policies 
must also be developed in the context of other 
countries' policies or they will fail.
Assignment
Prepare recommendations for a new international 
agreement for trade in textiles and clothing that 
would be acceptable to Bangladesh, China, 
Honduras, the EU, and the United States. Discuss 
the policy issues with regard to support for and
resistance to eliminating quotas. Justify your 
recommendations, and assess the consequences for 
stakeholder groups.
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